

12 Aug 87

Surprises, w/out early part of war:

Country & critics of our race:

- such initial prolif, so far.
- no accidental explosion, so far.
- no contact used, since Nagasaki.
- "even things we feared have been stabilized
FU in early contact (US twice, SU now).
- threats have retained some potency, and have
~~shape~~ been used, despite parity.
- D-C plans, and early props, persist
despite ultra-high-level parity.
(and, production/deployment of nucs).
- no FS - ^{on} promptness, felar alarm or attrition,
as far.
- Plans, and real prospects, of limited war <sup>(contracting tentacles
of war forms)</sup> are even
persistent, despite parity): nuclear instability
is not assumed

But see:

- crisis before
WWII;

- "no previous
failure is

challenge
program"

(though my
own - misno

and much concern,
all recent)

Consider effects of encouraging the
public - and ^{all RAND} staffs - to fear
the "real possibility of a aggressive
imperial nuclear attack" - as
defining the character of the SU,
an "adversary". (Kennan's point, in 1949
and recently)

(with ^{SU} experts, and top officials,
knew recently this fear was not
warranted).

and this impression of SU, quite misleading.

Kennan forwarded ⁰⁾ CR - but ¹⁾ not with
notes - and ²⁾ not roll-back; ³⁾ he did
not fear SU roll-back; but (4) opposed
we build-up. [and H-bomb?]]

He did not make 1, 2, 3, 4 clear
in Mr. X article! nor (5) explicit in
other times!

(He did justify CR - "classic" CW
times! like NSC-68 (which disregarded on
1-4!]